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The development of the American economy was accompanied by significant spatial income inequalities
between the northern and southern regions. While many factors contributed to northern industrialization
and southern stagnation, an important factor was differences in their institutions. In the North, a democratic
institution fostered growth whereas in the South, an oligarchic institution favored status quo. To gain
some insights on the nature and causes of the divergence of these institutions, this paper examines
the development of political and legal institutions in Massachusetts and Virginia, the two leading states









  Economic development is often accompanied by growing spatial income inequalities.
1 In 
the United States, the shift from an agricultural to an industrial nation coincided with a 
significant divergence in northern and southern incomes. In the colonial period, when the 
economy was agricultural and extractive, the wealth per capita was relatively similar in the 
northern and southern colonies (Jones (1980)). By 1840, however, income per capita in the 
North, especially in New England where industrialization began, exceeded that of the South 
(Fogel (1989)).
2 In the second half of the nineteenth century, as the industrial revolution spread 
in the North, income per capita between the North and South diverged even more considerably 
(Easterlin (1960)). Southern incomes finally started to converge toward northern levels in the 
second half of the twentieth century (Kim (1998), Mitchener and McLean (1999)).  
  While factors associated with slavery, capital, labor and resource endowments may have 
contributed to the growth of U.S. regional spatial inequality, the divergence in regional political 
and legal institutions was also a major contributing factor.
3 In the colonial period, the North 
emerged with democratic institutions which fostered trade and development whereas the South 
arose with plutocratic institutions which fostered agrarianism. In the early nineteenth century, the 
North experienced a shift in its legal institutions to a judge-based, “instrumental” law which 
promoted industrial development whereas the South held onto its traditional jury-based, common 
law which defended the agrarian status quo. Even after independence and the formation of the 
United States, state political and legal institutions remained diverged through the antebellum 
                                                 
1 See Kim (2007) for a review of the literature on spatial inequality and development. 
2 In 1840, for the free population, the income per capita in 1860 prices in the Northeast was $130 as compared to 
$105 for the South; in 1860, the figures were $183 and $150, respectively. See Fogel (1989). 
3 See Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Kim and Margo (2004), Hughes and Cain (2007), and Atack and Passel 
(1994) for a review of the literature.   4
period due to federalism and states’ rights.
4 With the outcome of the Civil War, the South faced 
a significant assault on its institutions but the convergence of their institutions toward those of 
their northern counterparts did not begin in earnest until the second half of the twentieth century. 
  Why did political and legal institutions diverge in historically colonial economies such as 
the U.S. North and South? Scholars have proposed two main classes of explanations. The first 
class emphasizes the role of historical accidents (North (1990), La Porta et. al (1998a, 1998b), 
and Glaeser and Shleifer (2002)). From the perspectives of the colonies, because the Spanish, 
Dutch, French, and the English colonizers brought with them different sets of institutions, their 
institutions were accidentally determined by the national identity of their colonizers. In general, 
these scholars believe that regions colonized by the British were more likely to inherit 
institutions of democracy and common law whereas those colonized by the Spanish and the 
French were likely to inherit centralized bureaucracies and civil law.
5 
  The second class of explanations focuses on the geographic conditions of the colonies. 
For Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000), the decisive factor was colonial factor endowments. In 
countries and regions where geography favored small scale farming, democratic institutions were 
likely to arise whereas in regions that favored plantation economies based on African or native 
slave labor, institutions based on elite-rule were likely to arise. For Acemoglu et. al (2001, 2002), 
colonial climate and native density or productivity were important factors. Since few Europeans 
settled in places with high settler mortality or high native population density, they had few 
incentives to develop democratic institutions in these colonies. 
                                                 
4 The distinctiveness of Southern politics in the first half of the twentieth century is well documented by Key (1949). 
5 For the United States, Berkowitz and Clay (2006) find that whether a country was settled by a country with a civil 
law system and was a member of the southern Confederacy during the Civil War had lasting impacts on state courts. 
They find that courts in these states had less judicial independence and were of lower quality. Michener and McLean 
(2003) also find that the institution of slavery was negatively correlated with long-run labor productivity.   5
   Whether the geographic distribution of institutions is determined by the identity of 
colonizers or by local colonial conditions, the establishment of stable political and legal 
institutions reflects a self-enforcing equilibrium solution to the fundamental dilemma of the state 
((North (1981), Acemoglu et. al (2004)). To establish property rights, it is necessary to have a 
state which has monopoly on violence; however, if the state has sole military power, then it has 
the incentive to extract rents from society. For North and Weingast (1989), the rise of the 
Parliamentary rule by oligarchs in Britain in 1688 was associated with a greater commitment by 
the state to curtail the power of royal prerogatives. For Acemoglu and Johnson (2000), the rise of 
democratic rule in Britain in 1832 represented a credible commitment by the state to distribute 
resources toward the masses and was a necessary response to the potential mass rebellion. 
  To understand the nature and causes of the divergence of U.S. northern and southern 
institutions, this paper examines the development of political and legal institutions in 
Massachusetts and Virginia, the two leading northern and southern states. Despite the important 
variations in political and legal institutions within the northern and southern states, 
Massachusetts and Virginia were important model states in their respective regions. Since 
settlers migrated westward along the latitudes, institutions developed in Massachusetts were 
transplanted into northern states such as Ohio and Illinois whereas those developed in Virginia 
found roots in southern states such as Tennessee and Alabama.
6 Thus, an understanding of the 
institutional developments in Massachusetts and Virginia will provide key insights to unlocking 
the causes of institutional divergence of northern and southern states. 
   In this paper, I argue that historical accidents, climate, and factor endowments all seem to 
have contributed to the divergence of political and legal institutions in Virginia and 
Massachusetts. Historical accidents, which led to diverging goals of Virginia and Massachusetts 
                                                 
6 See Matthews (1962), Steckel (1983), Meinig (1993) and Kim and Margo (2004).   6
Bay companies led to significant divergence of demographic structures and political institutions 
during their early years of colonization. In Virginia, in order to control its workforce largely 
composed of young male servants and convicts, a highly undemocratic military regime arose. In 
Massachusetts, however, the religiously homogenous and egalitarian populace rebelled and 
fought for democratic concessions from the religious elites who feared mob rule. 
  After these early years, the differences in their climates contributed to the continued 
divergence in demographic and institutional structures in Virginia and Massachusetts. In 
Virginia, the extremely high morality rates created an unsettled community which could only be 
sustained by the continual recruitment of new, poor, young male servants until the death rates 
stabilized in the eighteenth century. As a stable free white population emerged over time, an 
important element of democracy was introduced with the election of the Houses of Burgesses; 
however, many important offices, such as the county justice, continued to be appointed for life.  
In Massachusetts, a stable community led to a surprisingly quick emergence of a democratic 
society based on elections on many levels of government.
7 While important elements of 
democratic rule were removed by the British government when Massachusetts became a royal 
colony in 1691, democratic institutions quickly re-emerged after American independence.    
  Finally, factor endowments contributed to a major divergence in agricultural scale 
economies in the northern and southern colonies which in turn contributed significantly to the 
divergence of political and legal institutions in these colonies. In Massachusetts, poor soil led to 
small scale agriculture, fishing and commerce; in Virginia, however, climate proved excellent for 
growing tobacco in large scale, especially with the introduction of slavery. Because the land laws 
                                                 
7 Even though Massachusetts did not possess democracy in the modern form defined by the enfranchisement of the 
entire adult citizenry, it possessed significant early elements of democracy. For Wilentz (2005, p.xix), “democracy 
appears when some large numbers of previously excluded, ordinary persons - what the eighteenth century called ‘the 
many’ - secure the power simply to select their governors but to oversee the institutions of government, as 
officeholders and as citizens free to assemble and criticize those in office.”   7
in Virginia based on headrights, unlike those in Massachusetts, enabled the southern elites to 
accumulate significant amounts of land, an elite landed gentry with strong common economic 
and political interests emerged in Virginia. Moreover, the institution of slavery itself also 
contributed to diverging legal developments between the northern and southern colonies.
8 
  The states’ coercive ability to enforce their laws and policies also played an important 
role in determining the level of democracy. Since the colonies relied on voluntary militia for 
their armies, the governor, council and elected officials were acutely aware of their limited 
military authority over the governed. Rebellion by the free masses was a constant threat. Even in 
Massachusetts, the elites granted greater levels of democracy only after facing severe threats of 
rebellion. In Virginia, the potential for mass rebellion led to a greater access to democracy, but 
this movement was short-lived when the elites regained upper hand with royal military support. 
In Virginia, the potential for rebellion by poor free whites also lessened over time as their 
incentives became more and more aligned with the elites under the institution of slavery and as 
the elites relied less on local militias composed of free whites for social control. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section II documents the historical development of 
political institutions in Virginia and Massachusetts; section III documents the development of 
their legal institutions. Section IV examines the role of states’ rights and federalism on the 
continued divergence of institutions in Virginia and Massachusetts. Section V explores the 
causes of institutional divergence and section VI concludes with a summary. 
 
II. The Political Institutions of Virginia and Massachusetts  
  Virginia and Massachusetts were both founded on the principles of royal corporate 
charters, but in the New World these colonies by necessity formed governing institutions which 
                                                 
8 See Morris (1996),Wahl (1998), Hindus (1980), Higginbotham (1978), and Tushnet (1981).   8
resembled commonwealths rather than corporations. Yet, even though both of these colonies 
were founded by peoples of one European nation with common history, culture and background, 
they emerged with differing political institutions over time. In the early years of settlement, 
Virginia struggled to form a working political order but eventually emerged with an oligarchic or 
plutocratic society. In Massachusetts, however, a more democratic form of government arose in a 
relatively short time. This section presents a selective historical account of the evolution of 
political institutions in these two colonies.
9  
  A. The Development of Political Institutions in Virginia 
  The founding of Virginia was based on a royal corporate charter drafted in 1606 for the 
Virginia Company which contained a mixture of private and royal organizational form. For profit 
making, the private company planned to establish plantations worked by servants and laborers 
under contract managed by overseers. The company was given the right to transport settlers, 
supply provisions and trade goods. For governing, however, the task was entrusted to three 
councils whose members were appointed by the King. The powers of government and ownership 
of land ultimately rested with the King who used instructions to give judicial powers to the local 
council and issued patents to grant land. 
  In 1607, 104 passengers in three vessels reached the Chesapeake and settled in 
Jamestown. The settlers were all male: a third to half were designated as gentlemen and the rest 
were artisans and laborers. By the order of the King, the identity of the local governing council 
was kept secret until arrival when the identity was to be revealed. The members of the council 
then chose a president. By most accounts, under the trying conditions of famine, disease and 
threat from Indians, the council form of government proved to be ineffective. In 1608, when 
                                                 
9 There are many excellent and comprehensive accounts of the histories of political institutions in Virginia and 
Massachusetts. For example, see Osgood (1904), Morgan (1975), Sydnor (1952), Wall (1972) and Andrews (1934).    9
many of the council members had died or returned to England, John Smith emerged as the leader 
who commanded the colony in military style using labor gangs. 
  In response to the ineffectiveness of the council government, the Virginia Company 
requested and was granted a new charter by the King in which the company had complete control 
over the colony. In London, the company took steps to run the colony under a military regime 
initiated by Smith.
10 The new leaders of the colony were old soldiers. Between 1611 and 1618, 
the company ruled the colony through a governor who exercised absolute powers.
11 The 
government forged by the first governor, Lord De la Warr, his deputy Sir Thomas Gates, and 
subsequent deputy Sir Thomas Dale, was a code of military rule known as Dale’s Laws. The 
settlers continued to work in gangs and were deprived of protection under the common law.
12 
  When the gang labor system and military rule failed to bear any fruit in the New World, 
the Virginia Company in 1618 re-organized its governing structure and introduced a charter of 
grants and liberties. The general assembly, which possessed the powers to make laws, was 
composed of the governor and council, who were chosen by the company as before, but it now 
also included two Burgesses from each district who were elected. In June 19, 1619, 22 Burgesses 
were elected for the first time. While evidence on the workings of the assembly is scant, it is 
                                                 
10 Shea (1983, 13-15): “Back in London the Virginia Company began to take steps to improve the colony’s fortunes 
along the militant lines Smith had initiated... the second experiment was modeled to some degree after contemporary 
English military expeditions to Ireland and the Low Countries... The leaders of this second phase of colonization 
were ‘excellent old soldiers’ who had served with distinction in Ireland and ‘that university of warre’ the Low 
Countries... Virginia’s military regime was unique in American history.”  
11 To improve the conditions in the colony, a decision was reached near the end of 1609 “to appoint a single head 
entrusted with exceptionally large powers. The company made up its mind to try a new experiment by sending to 
America a single and absolute governor, with authority so extensive as to make him almost a dictator for life.” 
Andrews (1934, p.107). 
12 Morgan (1975, p.80) wrote: “The Laws prescribed death for variety of crimes, including rape, adultery, theft, 
lying, sacrilege, blasphemy, or doing or saying anything that might 'tend to the derision' of the Bible. On a more 
practical level, in order to increase the livestock which had by this time been brought over, the Laws made it death 
to kill any domestic animal, even a chicken. It was also death, in weeding the garden, to take an ear of corn or a 
bunch of grapes from it, death too to trade privately with anyone on the ships that came to the colony. And, the 
punishments were inflicted with an arbitrary rigor that became a scandal. For stealing two or three pints of oatmeal a 
man had a needle thrust through his tongue and was then chained to a tree until he starved.”   10
doubtful whether Virginia achieved a fully working form of government during this period. 
Nevertheless, the election of the Burgesses signaled a significant turning point in Virginia 
history. It marked the beginnings of a two-tier plutocratic society where access to political 
participation was open to the elites but closed for most of the masses.
13 
  When the financially troubled Virginia Company was dissolved by the King in 1624, 
Virginia became a royal colony and the King appointed the governor and the council of the 
general assembly. Given the distance from England and a the lack of a royal standing army, 
however, the royal governor could not overrule the colonists on important matters. The 
Virginians made up of the Houses of Burgesses and the council were able to effectively legislate 
on matters of taxes and law. As the Virginia colony stabilized and grew over the seventeenth 
century, the government of Virginia evolved into its mature colonial form and formed political 
boundaries in counties and parishes. 
  More than the transition to a royal colony, the introduction of tobacco seeds of the 
Spanish West Indian variety by John Rolfe in 1617 had a major impact on the social organization 
of Virginians. With the tobacco boom of the 1620s, immigration of male indentured servants and 
share tenants increased. Under the headright system introduced in 1618, a settler who came on 
his own or who paid the transportation of someone else was entitled to 50 acres. In these early 
years, given the abundance of land, the societal division arose in terms of the accumulation of 
servants. The growing of tobacco was both intensive in land and labor, but labor was scarce. 
Evidence show that the elites were able to acquire numerous indentured servants, often by illegal 
                                                 
13 Morgan (1975, 124): “The company in 1618 had inaugurated a popularly elected representative assembly, but the 
effective power remained in the governor and his council. By no coincidence, the council consisted almost entirely 
of men holding large numbers of servants... These men, with a more than average interest in controlling the labor 
force, were thus enabled to maintain their personal ascendancy not only over their servants but over all lesser men. 
Whether operating under the company or, after 1625, under the king, they met every challenge to their authority 
with a rigor not exceeded by what we know of the earlier absolute government of John Smith or Thomas Dale.”     11
means. The muster of inhabitants in 1625 show that the officers of the Virginia Company each 
held 10 to 39 servants.
14 
  The elites were able to accumulate wealth and hold political power, but the basis for their 
power was precarious since they relied on local militias to enforce their laws. As mortality rates 
stabilized, an increasing share of the population was composed of free single males who once 
were servants. In the early seventeenth century, election of the Houses of Burgesses were held 
infrequently at the discretion of the governor; however, as free whites became more numerous 
and rebellious, Governor Berkeley was forced to hold new elections with greater access to 
voting.
15 In the election of 1676, the free whites were able to vote into office a large share of 
their choices. However, this movement toward greater access was short-lived. When the Bacon’s 
rebellion collapsed, the elites re-established their political authority, confiscated the property of 
those who rebelled, and re-established the status-quo of elites. 
  The introduction of slavery solidified the elite rule based on the ownership of land and 
slaves rather than on servants. In this period, a mature, stable, plutocratic society emerged based 
on planter elites (Kulikoff (1986)). Prior to the eighteenth century, based on the identity of 
justices in tidewater Maryland, Kulikoff finds that justices were highly varied in background. 
However, by the mid-eighteenth century, the justices and burgesses were dominated by the 
planter gentry. In the late seventeenth century, Virginia justices and burgesses, as well 
councilmen, used their public offices to patent thousands of acres of frontier land. By 1705, 
                                                 
14 Morgan (1975, 123-4): “It seems that while the Virginia Company was failing in London, a number of its officers 
in the colony were growing rich. In order to do so, they not only rendered less than faithful service to their 
employers; they also reduced other Virginians to a condition, while short of slavery, was also some distance from 
the freedom that Englishmen liked to consider as their birthright. The company in 1618 had inaugurated a popularly 
elected representative assembly, but the effective power remained in the governor and his council. By no 
coincidence, the council consisted almost entirely of the men holding large numbers of servants... Whether operating 
under the company or, after 1625, under the king, they met every challenge to their authority with a rigor not 
exceeded by what we know of the earlier absolute government of John Smith or Thomas Dale.” 
15 In order to keep the same men in office in the House of Burgesses, Governor Berkeley did not call for a general 
election for 15 years between 1661 and 1676 (Andrews (1934, 247)).    12
three-fifths of Virginians who owned 2,000 or more acres of land were justices or burgesses. By 
the mid-eighteenth century, strong political dynasties formed. For example, more than a quarter 
of the 1,600 justices appointed in Virginia between 1757 to 1775 belonged to only 55 
patrilineages. The gentry used entail and marriage to consolidate the political ruling class. 
  The governor usually chose council members from the top families of the planter gentry. 
Sydnor (1952) finds that a small number of families enjoyed the powers of this office. Only 57 
family names appear from 1680 to the Revolution as council members; nine families account for 
almost a third of the councilors during this century. The House of Burgesses was the only elected 
body in Virginia, but the election was also controlled by the elite gentry.
16 Election dates were 
chosen by the governor and two members were elected from each county and one each from 
Jamestown, Williamsburg, and the College of William and Mary. 
  In Virginia, the county became the most important level of government for most people. 
Moreover, unlike Massachusetts, where local town officials were elected by freemen, county 
officials in Virginia were appointed and these officials possessed broad legislative, executive and 
judicial powers.
17 County justices, who individually settled disputes on small debts and 
collectively composed the county court, were appointed to serve for life by the governor. In 
practice the justices provided the governor with a nominee who the governor then commissioned. 
The county justices not only decided on issues of law but they also set tax rates, allocated county 
funds, and managed roads and bridges. Just as importantly, the county justices appointed local 
government officials, such as the sheriff (who enforced laws, managed jails, collected taxes, 
managed the treasury, and conducted elections), coroner, militia officers below rank of brigadier, 
and tobacco inspectors. 
                                                 
16 See Sydnor (1952), Griffith (1968), and Morgan (1975).  
17 Most scholars believe that the government in Virginia was undemocratic (see Porter (1947), Sydnor (1948, 1952), 
Morgan (1975)). However, Brown and Brown (1964) contend that Virginia was much more democratic.   13
  B. The Development of Political Institutions in Massachusetts 
  The Massachusetts Bay Company, formed in 1629, was based on a corporate charter, 
much like those of the earlier Virginia Company except in one important aspect.
18 In all the 
previous colonies, they were managed chiefly for profit and controlled by proprietors in England 
and the colonists were not entitled to the right of self-government. For Osgood (1904), the 
founding of the Massachusetts Bay colony marked a major change where the government of the 
plantation was transferred to those who lived in the colonies. For governing, the general court, 
prior to their departure in England, elected Winthrop as governor of colony and company, 
Dudley as deputy governor, and 18 other assistants. For profit making, the company created a 
temporary trusteeship known as undertakers who assumed control of assets and liabilities of the 
joint stock. Undertakers were to receive profits from the fur trade, the salt-making monopoly, 
and the transportation of passengers and goods. 
  In 1630, approximately 700 individuals in 11 ships sailed for New England. When the 
settlers arrived in Massachusetts Bay, they intended to work and live as a corporate body in one 
location where each settler received an allotment of land based on their investments.
19 Within 
months of their arrival, however, these plans were abandoned as settlers dispersed into nearby 
areas, formed separate towns and claimed land for themselves. These early settlements were 
established without the explicit authority of the general court. In addition, as the commercial 
element of the Massachusetts Bay Company quickly disappeared, trade was authorized to take 
place in private hands and the colony became a de facto commonwealth. 
                                                 
18 The discussion on Massachusetts will concentrate on the Massachusetts Bay colony. Even though the Plymouth 
colony was founded earlier, the larger Massachusetts Bay colony was more influential for political developments in 
Massachusetts. In 1691, these two colonies joined to form Massachusetts. See Osgood (1904). 
19 Rutman (1965, 44) “... the company offered large tracts of land to actual investors in the enterprise, two hundred 
acres per fifty pounds invested. The fact that an individual transported himself, his family, and his servants to the 
settlement was, in itself, considered as an investment and also subject to return. Hence, those actual purchasers of 
the company's stock who traveled to the New World were to receive fifty acres for themselves and every member of 
their family...”   14
  In Massachusetts, unlike Virginia, a democratic government based on regular elections 
arose in a relatively short period of time. Immediately, Winthrop and his associates were forced 
to recognize the new towns, fix their boundaries, and give them the rights to grant land. They 
were also forced to relinquish oligarchic control as large number of colonists applied for 
admission as freemen. In 1634, the colony declared that the freemen alone had power to admit 
new freemen, make laws, appoint officers, raise money and grant lands in the commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. The General Court, composed of two elected deputies from each town, was 
authorized with legislative powers; the governor and the assistants elected by freemen retained 
executive and judicial powers. 
  The General Court also took control over unoccupied lands and claimed the exclusive 
rights to grant land and create townships (Akagi (1924), Martin (1991), and Price (1995)). 
Prospective settlers, called proprietors, petitioned the General Court for a grant of land.
20 
Although the land was granted freely, starting a town was an expensive and complicated affair 
(Martin (1991)). Town promoters, often politically connected and experts in Indian affairs, 
coordinated the founding of towns and received land for their services. The General Court 
surveyed the land, coordinated its purchase from the local Indians, and then granted it to 
proprietors who were given exclusive rights to distribute land and admit new town members. The 
General Court also gave towns a considerable degree of local political control and in 1641, 
selectmen were officially designated as chief administrators of local affairs.  
                                                 
20 The town proprietors allocated land for house lots, meadow lands for hay and grazing, and upland for cultivation. 
Land was not divided equally and the amount of acreage allocated depended upon variety of considerations such as 
wealth, occupation, family size, and participation in the purchase of the land. The average initial allocation of land 
was relatively small in many towns and averaged fewer than 30 acres per proprietor. In most towns, a great majority 
of land was set aside for future division and each proprietor was given shares of this undivided land. As towns 
increased in size, new town members became non-proprietors with no rights to undivided land. In many towns, 
conflicts arose between proprietor and non-proprietors over the control of land and the town government. By the 
early eighteenth century, the General Court gave the rights to the undivided land to the original proprietors but the 
governing body of towns included non-proprietors.   15
  In Massachusetts, democratic town governments became the most important local 
institution. Once a year in March, freeholders met to elect local town officials: clerk, selectman, 
treasurer, constable and many lesser offices. Since the voting procedure was left to the discretion 
of towns, there was a great deal of variation in electoral practices. Over time, the elections were 
handled by a moderator, used written but not secret ballots, and became more formal (Cook 
(1976)). Yet, towns were not free of disputes. Because towns were often ill-equipped to settle 
and enforce disputes, Konig (1979) argues that the quarterly courts were an indispensable 
institution for establishing social order throughout the colony.
21 
  The continual movement toward a democratic government in Massachusetts occurred 
under considerable dissension and debate (Breen (1970)). For a colony founded to form a 
religious community, the political separation of church and state was a major issue, especially in 
the early years. Related to the idea of the religious and moral authority of the ruler was whether 
political leaders possessed wide discretion or possessed delegated authority. While dissension on 
the right form of government never dissipated, political debates increasingly became more 
secular and were on topics of property and liberty rather than of scripture and religion. 
  With the return to power of the Stuarts in 1660 in England, the Massachusetts colony 
faced a major challenge to its autonomy. In an abrupt change of policy, the King and the Board 
of Trade annulled the original charter in 1684 and established royal political authority over the 
colony. Massachusetts and other northern colonies were consolidated into a single Dominion of 
New England and placed under the rule of a royally-appointed governor. Representative 
                                                 
21 The colonists, according to Konig (1979), drew upon their English experience and created a judicial system based 
on the patterns of English county, the borough justices of peace, and courts of quarter sessions. Because some of the 
early leaders of the Massachusetts Bay colony, John Winthrop and Richard Bellingham, were justices of peace in 
their respective home counties in England, the Puritan reformers placed great responsibility on the justices of peace. 
Over time, however, the effectiveness of these justices of peace declined as communities became less cohesive and 
the county justices who met once a quarter became much more effective.   16
government and town authority were significantly curtailed. While an elected House of 
Representatives became the legislative body, and nominated the members of the upper house,  
the governor, selected the Council from the representatives’ list of nominees and his signature 
was necessary for an enactment to became law.  
  The period under royal rule between 1684 and 1776 was a period of uneasy compromise. 
When property rights and representation were significantly undermined as were under the rule of 
the royal governor Edmund Andros in 1686, the colonists rebelled by arresting Andros thereby 
setting the boundaries of what they would allow. After the Andros affair, the royal governors 
learned to work within the limits of their authority, but for colonists who developed their own 
political institutions based on electoral representation, the royal government never gained full 
legitimacy. In the eighteenth century, as the interests of England and the American colony 
continued to diverge, the colonists who without representation on major policies rebelled to 
recover their democratic institutions developed in their early years of colonial history.  
 
III. The Legal Institutions of Massachusetts and Virginia 
  In the colonial period, the legal institutions in Virginia and Massachusetts were local, 
jury-based, and founded on the common law tradition of England (Nelson (1975)).
22 To the 
extent that there were divergent trends in these two colonies, they may be accounted for by the 
fact that early colonists did not bring with them the English common law of the King’s court, but 
rather the customary law of English local courts which varied by region (Groebel (1931), Allen 
(1981)). Moreover, in Massachusetts, there seems to be some evidence that local colonial 
                                                 
22 The Anglo-Saxon English common law, compared to Roman Civil Law, was more diffuse in its historical origin 
and application, reflecting the diversity of England after the end of Roman occupation. Common law operated on 
two tiers: at the royal, aristocratic level, common law system evolved into a complex body of rules interpreted by 
trained lawyers and judges; at the local level - counties, manors, and boroughs, common  law rested on long-
established customary practices (see Hall (1989)).     17
circumstances may have led to changes in the application of common law (Konig (1979)). On the 
other hand, in Virginia, courts were presided by country justices with little education in law for 
most of the colonial period (Roeber (1981), Konig (1992), Miller (1994)). 
  Property law in the American colonies, especially in New England, according to Priest 
(2006), may have diverged significantly from that of English law in its alienability. As the 
property law in England was designed to protect the devolution of real property, an individual’s 
title to land was protected from the claims of unsecured creditors. In New England, however, the 
colonial legislatures moved to reject English protection of real property and, in 1732, the 
Parliament endorsed this movement by enacting a statute known as the Debt Recovery Act. 
Thus, in Massachusetts and elsewhere, land became equivalent to any other property. While the 
act was designed to apply in all the American colonies, evidence suggests that Virginia may have 
remained an important exception. In Virginia, the use of primogeniture, entail and local juries 
provided an important mechanism for protecting real property from creditors.
23 
  In the first half of the nineteenth century, legal scholars believe that the American legal 
system went through a more fundamental transformation. In this period, the legal system went 
from jury-based, common law to judge-based, “instrumental” law (Nelson (1975) and Horwitz 
(1977)).
24 While the evidence of the geographic divergence of legal systems between 
Massachusetts (North) and Virginia (South) is relatively scant, a growing number of scholars 
                                                 
23 Differences in inheritance laws between Massachusetts and Virginia provide additional evidence for the 
divergence of legal systems between these two colonies during the colonial period. While Virginia and the southern 
colonies (including Rhode Island and New York) practiced the common law of primogeniture widely practiced in 
England, Massachusetts and other New England colonies adopted male multigeniture, a practice found in County of 
Kent. Since primogeniture would prevail without legislation, multigeniture required an act of the colonial legislature 
(Alston and Shipiro (1984)). Virginia adopted primogeniture and entail which significantly reduced the potential 
devolution of property. While Keim (1968) finds that only a small percentage of property in Virginia was subject to 
entail, Brewer (1997) argues that Keim’s estimates are flawed and that a larger share of property may have been 
subject to entail. 
24 To the contrary, Simpson (1979) and Schwartz (1981) argue that the Horowitz thesis is unfounded in the data. 
Both of these scholars claim that there was no radical change in law between the late eighteenth and the early 
nineteenth centuries.    18
believe that Massachusetts was a leader in this transformation whereas Virginia remained a 
laggard (Ely and Bodenhamer (1984), Konig (1992), Miller (1994), among others).
25 Cases from 
Massachusetts (and New York) state supreme courts were cited, but those from Virginia and 
other southern states were ignored (Friedman (1984)). 
  A. Colonial Law in Massachusetts and Virginia 
  For Nelson (1975), pre-revolutionary law in Massachusetts was characterized by a legal 
system based on the British common law tradition of local communal consensus. One of the 
most important features of pre-revolutionary law was that the jury ruled both as law and fact.
26 
Because norms of local communities varied, and since local juries did not provide written 
commentaries on their decisions, jury-based law did not provide a sound basis for a uniform law 
over a wide geographic area. Moreover, the common law concept of fair exchange, often 
determined by the ethical norms of a local community, subjected the enforceability of a contract 
to local community standards of fairness. Likewise, under common law, corporations were 
believed to be created by the legislature for public rather than for private purposes and their 
charters could be amended or abolished for the communal purposes of a community.  
  Common law property rights gave the land owner the right to prevent the use of any 
neighbor's land that conflicted with his own quiet enjoyment. The natural use and prescription 
doctrines limited the use of a property to natural uses (agriculture) and gave monopoly rights to 
                                                 
25 Campbell (1975) and Huebner (1999) argue that, while Virginia’s legal system was not as advanced as that of 
Massachusetts, the legal system in Virginia was also moving away from common law to instrumental law. 
26 Nelson (1975, 3-4): “The fact that juries rather than judges regularly decided law applicable to litigated cases tells 
us much about pre-Revolutionary law and society. It demonstrates first that the law applied in the towns of 
Massachusetts on a day-to-day basis was not the product of the will of some distant sovereign; on the contrary, jury 
verdicts given without benefit of binding and unambiguous judicial instructions must have reflected jurors’ 
experience either with common law as it had been customarily applied in their towns or with other customs that their 
towns observed as law. The power of juries over the law also tells us that the legal system did not serve as an 
instrument for majoritarian resolution of group conflict and the enforcement of the will of the most powerful group... 
In a legal system in which juries have the power to find the law, whatever disputes arise cannot be resolved by mere 
majoritarian fiat but must be resolved by a process of consensus building that produces legal rules acceptable to a 
broad base of society as a whole.”   19
the first developer of a resource. Horwitz (1977) argues that property rights under common law 
hindered development. These laws raised the costs of building roads, canals and railroads as well 
as building mills for water power. For example, the natural use doctrine did not allow the 
alteration of water flow except in its natural channel and any use of water that conflicted with the 
interests of other land owners along the stream was an unlawful invasion of property.  
  Common law principle of contract was based on the fairness doctrine that sought to 
protect people from unfair exchanges. The fairness standard, however, created uncertainty in 
contractual transactions. Under the fairness doctrine, if two parties agreed on a contract on the 
delivery of a good at a specified price, the contract could be nullified by the courts if the contract 
was deemed to be unfair to one party. Thus, the enforceability of a contract was at the discretion 
of the courts rather than bounded by the agreement drawn up by individuals.
27 Since the 
standards of fairness may differ between jurors in different communities, the fairness principle 
raised the costs of transactions across localities. In addition, the fairness standard limited the 
negotiability of a contract. If individual A gave a promissory note to B, who transferred the note 
to C, then C could not sue A in the event that the contract was breached. 
  B. Post-revolutionary Law in Massachusetts 
  Between the American Revolution and the early nineteenth century, the legal institution 
in Massachusetts was transformed from one based on preserving status quo and traditional social 
stability to one based on free will, uniformity and predictability for economic exchange (Nelson 
(1975), Horwitz (1977)). Between 1804 to 1809, reforms were enacted to limit jury power. The 
                                                 
27 Horwitz (1977, 167): “What we have seen of eighteenth century doctrines suggests that contract law was 
essentially antagonistic to the interests of commercial classes. The law did not assure a businessman the express 
value of his bargain, but at most its specific performance. Courts and juries did not honor business agreements on 
the face, but scrutinized them for the substantive equality of their exchange. For our purposes, the most important 
consequence of this hostility was that contract law was insulated from the purposes of commercial transactions. 
Businessmen settled disputes informally among themselves when they could, referred them to a more formal process 
of arbitration when they could not, and relied on merchant juries to ameliorate common law rules.” 
   20
law finding function was shifted from the jury to the judge and the jury’s task was relegated to 
fact finding functions such as determining the credibility of the witness or weighing the 
probability of competing testimonies. Moreover, the common law of contract was replaced by 
the “will theory” of contract. What mattered was whether individuals agreed on the terms of the 
bargain rather than whether the agreement was fair, foolish or inequitable to a party. These 
developments reduced the uncertainty of contractual exchanges and the costs of market 
transactions.  
  The will theory of contract affected many areas of economic activity. In the sale of land, 
individuals were free to devise contracts which were binding in courts. The sentiment for will 
theory was expressed by Chief Justice John Marshall: “To deny the power of two individuals, 
capable of acting for themselves, to make a contract for the purchase of land and sale of lands 
defeasible by the payment of money at a future date, or, in other words, to make a sale with 
reservation to the vendor a right to repurchase the same land at a fixed price and at a specified 
time, would be to transfer to the Court of Chancery, in a considerable degree, the guardianship of 
adults as well as of infants.” 
  In pre-revolutionary law, caveat emptor did not apply. For example, if two people 
bargained over a horse and the horse died subsequent to exchange, the buyer could sue the seller 
for damages. In post-revolutionary law, the will theory of contract increased the importance of 
caveat emptor. Thus, even if a person purchased a defective good, the buyer was now 
responsible for his actions. By limiting the buyers’ right to sue for decline in the quality of goods 
after purchase, caveat emptor reduced the transactions costs of market exchanges. 
  Common law viewed corporations as similar to municipalities which were created for 
public rather than private purposes. In the early nineteenth century, Massachusetts recognized the   21
private nature of corporations, upheld the private contractual nature of the corporate charter, and 
provided limited liability to managers and shareholders. In Ellis v. Marshall (1807), the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court made a firm distinction between public and private 
corporations. In deciding that a private corporation was distinct from a public corporation, the 
court effectively limited legislative authority over corporations.
28 Likewise, in Wales v. Stetson, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that private corporations were closer to contracts than 
municipal governments.
29  
  In Gray v. Portland Bank (1807) the Massachusetts Supreme court established that the 
officers of a corporation had fiduciary duty to its shareholders. In the early nineteenth century, it 
was not clear whether a breach of contract or in tort could be brought against a corporation rather 
than its officers who performed the injury-creating act. In Gray and Riddle v. Locks and Canals 
on Merrimack River (1810), the court ruled that corporations could be sued for damages. 
However, while the corporation could be sued for damages, the court also gave the officers and 
shareholders of the firms limited liability. In Nichols v. Thomas (1808) the court ruled that 
owners were not personally liable for the debts of the firm. 
  In Massachusetts, the state legislature played an important role in eroding the common 
law vested property rights through enacting mill acts in the early nineteenth century. The 
                                                 
28 In this case, Front Street Corporation, consisting of all landowners of land over which a street would pass was 
given power to assess its members for the making of a street in Boston. However, Marshall, the defendant, refused 
to pay and his adjoining land was sold at auction to pay for the deficiency. Ellis bought the land and then sued in 
ejectment to oust Marshall. In this case, Justice Parker ruled that the Front Street Corporation was a private rather 
than a public firm, such as one that might have provided common sewers. The court ruled that the charter of the 
Front Street Corporation became void when Marshall refused membership. The Ellis case was prominently cited in 
the Supreme Court case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819). 
29 In Wales, the Blue-Hill Turnpike Corporation sued Stetson for passing without paying a toll and ripping down a 
gate. Stetson argued that a general act passed by Massachusetts in 1805 prohibited turnpike corporations from 
erecting gates on pre-existing roads. However, the Blue-Hill Turnpike Corporation had been chartered in 1803. 
Justice Parsons ruled if favor the Turnpike Corporation: “We are satisfied that the rights legally vested in this, or any 
corporation, cannot be controlled or destroyed by any subsequent statute, unless a power for that purpose be 
reserved to the legislature in the act of incorporation.” Wales was the primary precedent for Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward (1819).   22
foundation of common law was the view that property owners had absolute dominion over their 
land.
30 Because the development of mills, water power or transportation often impacted 
negatively on adjacent private properties, the hold-up costs associated with vested rights doctrine 
raised the costs of development. The mill acts lowered the costs of litigation by allowing the 
owner to flood a neighbor’s land and pay an annual compensation specified by the act. Thus, the 
legislature reversed the common law rule that flooding the land of a neighbor created an injury 
and nuisance (Hall (1989)). 
  The state legislature also used the power of eminent domain to shift property rights of 
externalities to the builders of roads, canals and railroads. The legislature and the courts 
recognized that the potential costs of common law damages for the building of roads, canals, and 
railroads were substantial. Under common law, every property owner along the transportation 
route could potentially sue for damages. The power of eminent domain provided immunity to 
private companies that built large public projects. Eminent domain, like the mill acts, 
undermined the traditional vested rights of property guaranteed under common law. 
  C. Post-revolutionary Law in Virginia 
  While the study of laws and legal systems in Virginia is not as developed as that of 
Massachusetts, scholars generally believe that the legal system in Virginia continued to 
champion the English common law traditions based on local juries (Miller (1994)).
31 Unlike 
                                                 
30 Before the nineteenth century, the common law view of water was a natural flow rule which restricted the uses of 
water for domestic and agricultural purposes. Beyond the natural use of water for supporting humans and animals, 
common law ruled that water flows and ought to flow, as it has customarily flowed, and that every man has a right 
to have the advantage of flow of water in his own land without diminution or alteration. In the early nineteenth 
century, a new view of water rights emerged. “Under the influence of the mill acts, men had come to regard property 
as an instrumental value in the service of the paramount goal of promoting economic growth (Horwitz (1977, 47-
51)). See Steinberg (1991). 
31 Miller (1984, ix): “This work runs counter to the view of the law during the early Republic from works – most 
importantly Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1790-1860 ... – that, by concentrating on 
New York and New England sources, have contended that America moved away from an agrarian and amateur or 
popular law to a commercial and professional law allied to business interests... Even if Morton Horwitz is right that   23
Massachusetts which transformed its legal system to foster industrial development, Virginia used 
its legal system to protect the landed interests of the elites. Virginia’s legal system inhibited 
development in a variety of ways: it favored debtors over creditors, favored landlords over 
tenants and sharecroppers, was slow to adopt caveat emptor or recognize private corporations, 
and adhered to “vested” rather than legislative rights (Ely and Bodenhamer (1984)).  
  In Virginia, unlike Massachusetts, Miller (1994) argues that the legal system continued to 
advance the traditional rights of the jury over the judge. Because a large share of civil suits 
between 1785-1825 involved British debt cases, the local jury system provided effective means 
to delay and reduce debt claims. The judges role in Virginia was only to answer a question 
concerning a specific point of law if requested. A judge instructing the jury was seen as an 
invasion of the jury’s province; judges in Virginia were not allowed to sum up the evidence at 
the end of the trial. In a series of cases brought to the appeals court on the relative roles of juries 
and judges, the Virginia appellate courts consistently upheld the traditional, common law rights 
of the jury. 
  Due to the lack of systematic legal studies, it is difficult to determine to what extent 
Virginia’s contract law was based on the common law fairness doctrine rather than the will 
theory introduced in Massachusetts. At best, the evidence is mixed. In Groves v. Groves (1790), 
Virginia’s lower court appeared to adopt the will theory of contracts by ruling for expectations 
damages in connection with a buyer’s action for securities, but the Virginia Court of Appeals 
subsequently reversed this decision (Horwitz (1977)). In the sale or hiring out of slaves, Wahl 
(1998) finds continued acceptance of the common law fairness doctrine, but Morris (1996) 
                                                                                                                                                             
the law became a means for transforming society and developing the economy of New York and New England, the 
evidence indicates that this sort of transformation was not occurring in Virginia, even in internal improvements 
(such as improving navigation and building canals).”   24
argues that, except for the Carolinas and Louisiana, southern judges adopted caveat emptor by 
the end of the eighteenth century.
32 
  In Virginia, corporate charters were often seen as a public good and the legislature either 
reserved the power to amend the charter or, if not, limited the duration of the corporation 
(Campbell (1975)).
33 In the well-known case of Currie’s Administrators v. Mutual Assurance 
Society (1809), Justice Spencer Roane ruled that the legislature could amend the original charter 
of the corporation.
34 The Mutual Assurance Society, an insurance scheme where members 
insured each other, was originally chartered by the legislature in 1794. However, in 1805, the 
legislature amended the charter under interest group pressure. Since country subscribers were 
subsidizing town subscribers who faced great danger of fire, the legislature separated the 
subscribers into the two groups. In 1805, Currie, a town dweller, brought a suit against the 
Society claiming that the 1805 act violated the society’s original charter by increasing rates 
without consent.  
  Roane upheld the 1805 legislative act and sided against Currie. Roane’s verdict is 
interesting on two important accounts. First, Roane’s decision is consistent with the common law 
theory of contract. Roane’s decision was fair in the common law sense because the rural 
residents should have contributed less than the urban interests and they should have been 
                                                 
32 Because Virginians tried to tie slaves to land, slaves were considered as realty for some purposes for most of the 
eighteenth century (Morris (1996)). 
33 While Ely and Bodenhamer (1986) believe that southern law diverged from northern law, they argue that southern 
courts enforced caveat emptor and accepted the private contractual nature of corporations. 
34 Spencer Roane served on Virginia’s Court of Appeals, the highest appellate court, between 1794 and 1822. Roane 
came from a wealthy Tidewater gentry family. Like many wealthy Virginians, he was educated at William and Mary 
where he received an English legal education based on the writings of Littleton, Coke and Blackston. He married the 
daughter of Patrick Henry, inherited a large estate from his father, acquired more land and slaves, and became a 
Tidewater planter himself. “English precedents and principles held a place of particular importance in Roane's 
decisions... In Roane’s view, English authorities stood on equal footing with decisions of Virginia’s courts... 
Hearkening back to the great legal tradition of English legal scholarship, Roane cited Blackstone and others in 
support of adherence to such long-established precedent... Roane’s conception of the judicial role combined a belief 
in strong, independent, authoritative judiciary with a devoting to the wisdom of the ages as expressed through the 
common law (Huebner (1999, 22)).”   25
protected from unfair exchanges. However, under the will theory of contract, the court would 
have upheld the original contract, even if it turned out to be unfair. Second, Roane did not 
believe in the sanctity of private corporations. Since corporations were created by legislatures for 
public rather than private purposes, the Mutual Assurance Charter was not sacred nor inviolate. 
Thus, the legislature was well within its rights to amend the charter, especially if it served the 
public.  
  In Virginia, the rights of property favored agriculture rather than transportation and 
manufacturing. The legal system through the use of local juries continued to uphold the 
traditional common law rights of property which raised the costs of industrialization. Unlike 
Massachusetts, where the mill acts and eminent domain were used by the legislature and the 
courts to transfer the rights of land use to transportation companies and manufacturing firms, the 
opposite remained true in Virginia. Whereas statute laws minimized compensation to affected 
land owners in Massachusetts, the local juries determined damages to landowners in Virginia.
35 
  Finally, scholars believe that Virginia and the South promoted a tradition of violence and 
extra-legal methods of enforcing behavior (Ely and Bodenhamer (1984), Friedman (1984)). In 
his study of criminal justice in South Carolina and Massachusetts, Hindus (1980) argues that 
South Carolina promoted extra-legal and informal authority whereas Massachusetts took strong 
steps to limit extra-legal authority. In Virginia (like South Carolina), extra-legal authority of 
                                                 
35 Crenshaw and Crenshaw v. Slate River Company (1828) provides an interesting eminent domain case in Virginia. 
In 1819, the state legislature created the Slate River Company and gave it eminent domain to open up navigation of 
the Slate River. The legislature ordered five mills on the river to build locks at their milldams for boats and if the 
millers failed to do so, the Slate River Company was entitled to destroy the milldams for being a nuisance in a 
public waterway. Ashbury and Thomas Crenshaw, the owners of the mills, brought a suit against the company. 
When the case went to the court of appeals in Virginia, the court ruled against the Slate River Company. The ruling 
is revealing in its emphasis on the power of local government and local juries. Although the state legislature had full 
authority to take land for public use, the court ruled that the county’s eminent domain powers, which granted the 
right to build mills on the Slate River, took precedence over the state's rights. In response, the state legislature did 
nothing (Miller (1994)). See Majewski (2002) for a similar case involving Shadwell Mills and Rivanna Navigation 
Company and James River and Kanawha Company in Albemarle County, Virginia.   26
planters was consistent with localism. In addition, slavery condoned violent behavior of whites 
such as whipping even though brutality of masters was restricted (Wahl (1998)). 
 
IV. States’ Rights and Federalism 
  The political and legal institutions between the northern and southern states continued to 
diverge after the American independence because the U.S. Constitution granted significant rights 
to states. While all states invoked “states’ rights” when it suited their purposes, these rights were 
held more strongly by southerners. For Madison, the Constitution established a system of divided 
sovereignty between the federal government and state governments; he wrote: “its (federal) 
jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a 
residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects (McDonald (2000, 20)).” The Bill of 
Rights was introduced to protect states’ rights and Jefferson called the Tenth Amendment “the 
foundation of the Constitution”; it provides that “the powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.” Consequently, the constitution was not adopted by a national vote but rather by a 
convention in each state to replace its own previous constitution (McDonald (2000, 24)). 
  The sentiment for states’ rights was the strongest in Virginia. When John Adams, a pro-
nationalist, was elected president, Virginians reacted strongly. In response to the Alien and 
Seditions Acts, which made it illegal to criticize the federal government, Madison and Jefferson 
wrote the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions in 1798. In these resolutions, Madison and 
Jefferson declared that the Constitution was a federalist compact and that state governments have 
the right to declare offensive federal laws illegal in their lands. In the early antebellum period,   27
Virginia’s call for its state's rights was only muted by the fact that a Virginian controlled the 
presidency most of these years. 
  The key institution for maintaining state sovereignty for Virginians was the local judicial 
system supported by a local militia.
36 In addition to the Bill of Rights, the Judiciary Act of 1789 
gave broad judicial powers to states. The boundaries of federal district courts were based on state 
boundaries. Most importantly, section 34 of the 1789 act dictated that federal judges rely on state 
rather than federal decisions on comparable points of law. While the Supreme Court gradually 




V. Evaluating the Causes of Institutional Divergence in the United States 
  Why did political institutions diverge between Virginia and Massachusetts during the 
colonial period? Why did the legal institutions between these two states diverge in the early 
nineteenth century? While it is challenging to identify the causes of institutional divergence 
based on the experience of two colonies (states), the histories of Massachusetts and Virginia shed 
valuable insights on why institutions diverged between the U.S. North and South. This study 
suggests that historical accidents, climate and factor endowments all were important contributing 
factors in the divergence of U.S. northern and southern institutions. 
                                                 
36 In the debate over the Constitution, the antifederalists feared that a centralization of power of the government 
achieved through standing armies in peace time would create an arbitrary, powerful, and despotic government. See 
Edling (2003). 
37 Miller (1994, 1-2): “In 1816, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story handed down the opinion in Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee. The Court claimed appellate jurisdiction over state courts on all matters touching federal law, and asserted 
the authority to reverse Virginia’s highest court on a question concerning state law. This was one of the most 
important precedents for nationalism set down by the Marshall Court. But, it was denounced in Virginia, and the 
judiciary refused to carry out the decision. The state's highest court declared that the Supreme Court did not have 
appellate jurisdiction over state courts, and the state legislature agreed... A number of Virginians were important in 
developing what became known as the Virginia doctrine, including William Branch Giles, Thomas Jefferson, James 
Madison, Edmund Pendleton, John Randolph, Spencer Roane, and John Taylor.” 
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  The initial differences in the private goals and strategies of the Virginia and 
Massachusetts companies led to major differences in their demographic characteristics and their 
early governing institutions. In Virginia, the goal of using plantation labor for profit led to a 
stratified demographic structure conducive to military rule. By contrast, in Massachusetts, the 
goal of establishing religious communities led to a homogenous, egalitarian population structure 
conducive to the rise of democratic government. Whereas the immigrants to Massachusetts had 
generally enjoyed common law rights in England and were familiar with the English county or 
borough judicial system, the majority of the Virginia immigrants, composed of servants and 
convicts, was denied these rights in England. Thus, the divergence of the early political 
institutions in Massachusetts and Virginia had English precedence (Konig (1982)). 
  Climatic differences of the American colonies contributed to the continued divergence of 
demographic structures and institutions in Virginia and Massachusetts. In Virginia, due to the 
extremely high mortality rates until the eighteenth century, there was a constant turnover of 
young, male servant population.
 38 The unbalanced sex-ratios and stratified demographic 
structure were not conducive to the introduction of a full-fledged democratic government in 
Virginia. As mortality rates stabilized and as increasing numbers of servants survived to form a 
sizeable population of free whites, an element of democracy was introduced in the form of the 
election of the Houses of Burgesses. Despite this change, however, as all other important offices 
were appointed, often for life, the elites were able to effectively control the government of 
Virginia. In Massachusetts, the low rates of mortality and low rates of immigration contributed 
the emergence of stable communities. After the early years, no sizeable numbers of new 
                                                 
38 Life expectancy at birth in Ipswich, Hingham, Salem, Andover towns in Massachusetts in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries were 55, 45, 35-37, 47-59, respectively. Life expectancy in Charles Parish and Middlesex 
County Virginia in the late seventeenth century were 7-8 and 15-22, respectively. Conversely, the crude death rate 
was significantly higher in Virginia than in Maryland. See Gemery (2000)).   29
immigrants were introduced. The stable, egalitarian demographic structure fostered the extension 
of democracy to many levels of government.  
  Factor endowments contributed to the divergence in economic and landholding structures 
which influenced the final development of institutional structures in the two colonies. In 
Massachusetts, a climate conducive to small scale farming contributed to egalitarianism and 
democracy. In Virginia, a climate conducive to tobacco plantations, led to the rise of plutocracy 
based on the political power of the landed gentry class. In Massachusetts, there was little 
economic incentive to accumulate large holdings of land the method of distributing land through 
town governments raised the costs of land accumulation. In Virginia, the land intensive tobacco 
farming provided significant incentive to acquire land and the headright system lowered the costs 
of accumulating large landholdings by elites. 
  The limits of state military capacity and the possibility of rebellion by the general 
population also played major roles in determining the structure of American colonial 
governments. In Massachusetts, democracy did not arise because the elites promoted it as an 
ideal form of government. Rather, the elites believed that democracy would lead to mob rule. 
Democracy emerged, in part, as the ruling elites were forced to grant electoral concessions to the 
general population under a constant threat of rebellion. In 1631, when taxes were imposed on the 
residents of Watertown to pay for the fortification of Newtown by an elite legislative body of 
“assistants,” the Watertown residents rebelled against what they believed was taxation without 
representation. In 1632, fearing outbreaks in other towns, the “assistants” called for the election 
of two freemen from each town to meet with them and discuss the question of raising funds by 
taxation. As theorized by Acemoglu and Johnson (2002), these electoral concessions served as a   30
credible commitment to a fair allocation of resources by the ruling state and were given to avert a 
mass rebellion. 
  In Virginia, the only elected office was the Houses of Burgesses. Because the elections 
were held at the discretion of the governor and all remaining offices, including important local 
offices such as sheriffs, were appointed, the elites had far greater control of the governing 
structure of Virginia. One reason for the political dominance of the landed elites was that, except 
for few brief episodes like the Bacon’s rebellion, the threat of rebellion by the masses was much 
lower in Virginia. Because the population in Virginia was much more dispersed and few towns 
existed, the costs of organizing a rebellion was much higher. More importantly, most free whites 
who were servants were not qualified for public office and the poor often relied on the landed 
elites for capital as well as marketing and retail services. With the rise of slavery, the incentives 
of all whites became much more aligned against African slaves. Finally, the elites were able to 
develop a better military organization under their control to subdue uprisings. 
  Legal institutions diverged only slightly between Massachusetts and Virginia during the 
colonial period since the English common law based on local jury law served both communities 
relatively well. Common law and the primacy of the local jury were consistent with the system 
of local militia. Since local juries ruled on law and fact, local juries defined law for their local 
communities. Given the limited military power of the state, the governing by a militia system 
dictated a legal system based on local consensus and fairness. Ordering a militia to enforce a 
legal decision that violated a community's sense of fairness was difficult at best.
39 
                                                 
39 Nelson (1975, 34-5): “Even if judges had been inclined to ignore precedent and to overrule jury decisions on 
questions of law, it is doubtful whether they could have enforced their judgments. The crucial fact about government 
in pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts was that subordinate officials like sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, and constables - the 
men with legal responsibility of enforcing judgments - could do so only when local communities were willing to 
permit judgments to be enforced... The basic problem was that if an official failed by himself to coerce a recalcitrant 
person he could not call for the aid of a substantial body of force other than his fellow townsmen, organized as the 
militia; if the townsmen were on the side of the recalcitrant person, they would not, of course, aid the official.”   31
  In the early nineteenth century, legal institutions in Virginia and Massachusetts diverged. 
In Virginia, planter gentry who controlled Virginia had great incentives to keep the legal 
institution based on common law and local juries as protection from arbitrary powers of a more 
centralized government. In Massachusetts, however, the argument that local juries ensured 
protection against the arbitrary use of powers by the state weakened. To the contrary, the full 
power to establish laws, statutes, and ordinances, provided that they are not repugnant to the 
Constitution, including the power to modify or repeal common law, was explicitly granted to the 
jurisdiction of the legislature.
40 Because democratic elections limited the arbitrary powers of the 
government, the people of Massachusetts favored a stronger centralized state government with a 
strong state military powers to enforce its laws. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
  This paper investigates the nature and causes of the divergence of political and legal 
institutions between Massachusetts and Virginia. In the colonial period, democracy arose in 
Massachusetts which fostered dynamism and long-run development, whereas in Virginia, an 
oligarchy emerged which favored status quo and agrarianism. In the early nineteenth century, as 
trade and industry developed in Massachusetts, instrumental, uniform state-wide law emerged, 
whereas in Virginia, traditional common law and local juries remained the primary basis for 
ensuring local control of society. The analysis of this paper suggests that a variety of factors, 
                                                 
40 Nelson (1975, 92): “New ideas about the relationship between government and the governed also produced 
changes in the rules of law concerning the rights and liabilities of various public officials. The perception that 
officials were agents of the people rather than of some distant, arbitrary governor raised doubts about the continuing 
validity of colonial rules holding officials strictly accountable for the infringements on liberty and for other low 
doings… Such thinking led to a number of changes that reduced the liability of officials in common law actions for 
damages.”   32
such as historical accidents, climate, factor endowments, and military capacity of the state, all 
contributed to the divergence of political and legal institutions in Virginia and Massachusetts.  
  It was also important that Virginia and Massachusetts were settled by the English with 
the Anglo-Saxon common law rather than the Roman civil law tradition. Unlike civil law, a 
system of positive rules codified in books called codes, the English common law had a two-tier 
system: the King’s court of chancery and the common law courts. Whereas the law of equity 
from chancery evolved into a complex body of rules understood by trained lawyers and judges, 
the common law for common people was based on local tradition, custom and precedents (Hall 
(1989)). In the American colonies, this common law heritage combined with local methods of 
selecting judges reinforced the development of localism and divergence (Ely and Bodenhamer 
(1986)). 
  The founding of American colonies in the seventeenth century provides a valuable 
historical experiment in the development of political and legal institutions in a new world. Even 
though the American colonies were established to extend the territory of the British Empire, 
distance and circumstances forced these colonies to develop their own governing institutions and 
seek independence over time. While the histories of Massachusetts and Virginia yield important 
clues as to why institutions diverged between the U.S. North and South, a fuller picture of the 
causes of institutional developments in the New World will no doubt emerge with additional 
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